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Abstract
This paper deals with information acquisition and communication
in networked organizations. Agents receive private signals about a
payoff-relevant parameter and may communicate it to other players to
whom they are linked. I derive a key condition that ensures truthful
communication. Since the degree of substitution between informa-
tion acquired and obtained through personal contacts depends on the
truthfulness of communication, information acquisition efforts may
not be monotonic. Finally, I show that these results hold in a modified
version of the game that includes potentially infinite many rounds of
communication.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long recognized the acquisition and transmission of infor-
mation between individuals as one of the key objectives of organizations
(Arrow (1974).) Indeed, organizations take over the role of prices when
these fail to accomplish their mission of aggregating disperse information
and encouraging individuals to take the appropriate actions. Mimicking
the role of prices in market transactions, organizational design should en-
able efficient information transmission within the organization and provide
the right incentives to create and maintain information flows from outside.
While these two elements have been separately studied in different papers,
this paper tries to analyze their interrelation and their implications for or-
ganizational design. I argue that this link may explain some of the features
of many real-world organizations.
An example of an organization in which information transmission is im-
portant is the stock market. Most information is conveyed through prices,
but it is also well-known that word-of-mouth communication and other net-
worked activities are ubiquitous in those environments. Shiller and Pound
(1986) shows that most trading decisions involved interpersonal commu-
nication, and very few agents spend resources in obtaining first-hand in-
formation. Similarly, Hong et al. (2005) finds strong correlation in the
positions of traders based on the same city, controlling for the location of
the assets. This evidence suggests a strong use of personal contacts in in-
formation acquisition. This has been neglected in the majority of papers
studying financial markets, where the information structure is a reduced-
form stochastic process. In particular, no explicit distinction is made about
the sources originating the signals1.
This paper highlights a bidirectional interaction between information
acquisition and communication. First, smooth information transmission
helps to disseminate relevant information and coordinate behavior, while
reducing the duplication of efforts in information acquisition. But differ-
ences in the information available to different agents will hamper their
(mutual) communication, since they introduce a wedge between their con-
ditional expectations after some signal is observed. Agents communicate
their signals before obtaining all the relevant information and use interim
beliefs which depend on the amount of information that they expect to
receive. For instance, more informed agents rely less on every particular
1An exception is Ozsoylev and Walden (2011)), who study a rational-expectations
equilibrium in which agents communicate truthfully their exogenously received signals
through an exogenous random network.
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signal than less informed agents. Hence, in general, beliefs about other
player’s beliefs may fail to be aligned and information transmission will be
noisy.
To get a grasp of the implications of this trade-off, I study a standard
beauty-contest type of game (Morris and Shin (2002)) where every agent
must take a decision facing a trade-off between adaptation to global uncer-
tainty and coordination with the rest of players. Importantly, and in con-
trast with prior literature, there is no exogenous conflict of interest among
the different players, in the sense that, conditional on the true realization
of the state of the world, all agents would agree on the same action. I allow
them to choose the amount of information they acquire (Hellwig and Veld-
kamp (2009), Myatt and Wallace (2011)) and to report this information
to their peers through a discrete (undirected) network. In the benchmark
model, this communication takes the simple form of a round of messages
in which every agent chooses a profile of reports to each of his peers con-
ditional on the information he owns.
I first provide a characterization of the networks that induce an equilib-
rium where every player who receives information communicates it truth-
fully, taking the profile of information acquisition efforts as given. I show
that in these networks, if two players are linked and at least one of them re-
ceives some information, the total amount of information they both expect
to receive must be the same. I then show that such condition is violated for
an important class of networks, trees of diameter larger than 2, that have
been widely studied in the economics of organization.
I then study the profiles of information acquisition efforts that may
emerge in equilibrium. I show that if the technology is linear, then a
truthful-revelation equilibrium exists (generically) only if the set of players
contains a subset such that no two members of the set are linked to each
other and such that all non members are linked to exactly one member.2 I
also show that information acquisition may not be monotonic in centrality.
Regarding welfare, I show that star networks are typically efficient in the
class of networks inducing a truthfully revealing equilibrium with linear
costs but I can also show that truthful-revelation is neither necessary nor
sufficient for a given network to attain the second best payoff. The reason
is that, under truthfully revealing communication, private signals become
public goods and there is, generically, underinvestment in information ac-
quisition. Networks with less specialization increase the total amount of
information acquired and increase the expected welfare of the group (as
2This definition is more restrictive than maximal independent sets used in Bramoulle
and Kranton (2007). See Section 4 for a comparison
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measured by the sum of utilities).
Finally, I show that my qualitative results extend to an environment
with more rounds of communication, as long as players leave the network
once they take their actions. In particular, I identify network structures for
which, independently of the number of rounds of communication, infor-
mation cannot be truthfully revealed between two linked players because
they will use it differently. Thus, even if the mechanism highlighted in this
paper requires players to use interim beliefs, the assumption of one round
of communication is not crucial3.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to a couple of strands in the literature. First, there
is a small but influential literature on communication in networked organi-
zations started by Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1988)4 (1991) and Radner
(1993), within the realm of team theory. There are no strategic issues and
the problem is simply to choose the optimal organization of workers to
minimize time processing, due to bounded rationality. The typical finding
of this literature is that hierarchical organizations are likely to be optimal
for information transmission purposes. Adding strategic incentives to the
transmission of information, we find that hierarchies are likely to be sub-
optimal since they yield a very unequal distribution of information and,
therefore, weak incentives for truth-telling.
Second, there is a growing literature of game-theoretical views of net-
worked organizations. Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2011) study information ac-
quisition and truthful and costly communication in networks. Ozsoylev
and Walden (2011) analyze a rational expectations equilibrium in the pres-
ence of communication via networks. They assume that communication is
truthful and that information acquisition is exogenously given. They show
that information acquisition is increasing in centrality in a linear-quadratic
model of network formation. However, this paper is the first study address-
ing information acquisition and strategic communication jointly. Another
strand of the literature has analyzed strategic information transmission in
networks. Hagenbach and Koessler (2010) analyze a game in which signals
are strategic complements and agents differ on their preference relation
over outcomes, but there is no information acquisition and the preference
divergence is exogenous to the network structure. Galeotti et al. (2013)
analyze a similar game, but their focus is on competing signals and analyze
3The crucial assumption is that agents may take actions after each round of reports.
4See also Bolton and Dewatripont (1994)
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the effect of congestion and other network characteristics on the amount
of information transmitted.
To conclude, two recent contributions analyze repeated communication
in societies. Anderlini et al. (2012) consider an organization composed
by one-period-lived agents who send reports to their successors regarding
some underlying uncertainty. They show that the existence of an exoge-
nous preference bias impedes common learning of the parameter of inter-
est. Bimpikis et al. (2014) is somewhat closer to the spirit of this paper
but they consider the case of large societies transmitting over time infor-
mation relevant to the decision of whether to undertake or not a project.
They highlight an strategic motive to lie to induce agents to transmit their
information, but they concentrate mostly on truthful communication.
2 Model
The economy is populated by a set N of n > 2 players, who are concerned
concerned with the realization of some aggregate uncertainty θ. In the
case of financial analysis, θ would be the fundamental value of an asset. I
assume that θ follows a normal distribution, N(0, τ−1σ ). Each player receives
a signal xi = θ + ηi, with ηi normal with zero mean and variance τ−1i ,
where τi is the precision the signal held by agent i. Notice that {xi}i∈N are
independent conditional on θ but may not be identically distributed, since
I allow each player to choose τi ∈ <+, by paying some cost c(τi). I assume
the cost function to be continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and
weakly convex. Let τ = (τ1, τ2, .., τn) be the profile of precision choices for
each player.
Agents are linked through an undirected and discrete network g, so
that i and j have a link if and only if ij ∈ g. A link is interpreted as the
existence of a communication channel between any two players. Define a
walk from i to j as a collection {k1, k2, .., km} such that k1 = i, km = j and
klkl−1 ∈ g for all l = 2, 3, ..,m. A path is the shortest walk between two
players, i, j, so that I write p(i, j). Let |p(i, j)| be its length. If such a path
does not exist |p(i, j)| = ∞. A network is connected if and only if for all i,
supj |p(i, j)| <∞.
A component gs ⊂ g is a subnetwork of g such that the nodes of gs, N s, is
a set of players satisfying for all i, j ∈ N s, p(i, j) <∞ and for all k ∈ N \N s
we have that p(i, k) =∞.
Players are then allowed to communicate their information with those
whom they are linked through g. For most of this paper, communication
takes the simple form of a single-round of simultaneous, private messages.
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Denote by Ni(g) = {j ∈ N : ij ∈ g} the set of neighbors of agent i, so
that every agent submits a message profile mi = {mij}j∈Ni(g) and learns
a message profile mi = {mji}j∈Ni(g). For simplicity, I shall assume that
mij ∈ R, so that a reporting (pure) strategy for agent i is a mapping
mi : < → <|Ni(g)|−1. I denote with Nij(g) = Ni(g)∩Nj(g) the set of common
neighbors of i and j, and Ni−j = Ni(g) \ Nij(g) the set of neighbors of i
who cannot communicate with j. Finally, let N∗i (g) = Ni(g) ∪ {i} be the
neighborhood of agent i augmented to himself5.
Once information is received and transmitted, all players must take an
action ai ∈ <, conditional on all the information available to maximize the
following loss-function
U(ai, a−i, τi; θ) = −(ai − θ)2 − 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(ai − aj)2 − c(τi) (1)
According to (1) every agent wants to match a weighted average of the re-
alization underlying uncertainty and the actions of other players. This loss-
function captures the standard trade-off between coordination and adap-
tation in a simple way. Notice that there is no ex-ante conflict of interest
among different agents. Let
ai : <× <|Ni(g)|−1 → < (2)
be the strategy of agent i contingent on her private information and the
messages of all other players with whom she is linked.
The Timing of Events is shown in Figure 1. In the first stage, nature
draws a state of the world and every agent chooses some information ac-
quisition τi. Every player observes the profile of precisions τ . Signals are
then drawn conditional on the state of the world according to the chosen
distributions. In the second stage, every player communicates to her peers
through an undirected network g. Finally, conditional on all her informa-
tion, every player chooses an action ai and payoffs are realized.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 contains a char-
acterization of the networked information structures such that a truthful
equilibrium exists. In Section 4 I present the results concerning informa-
tion acquisition in networks admitting a truthfully revealing equilibrium.
Section 5 introduces welfare considerations. In Section 6 I extend the
benchmark model in order to allow for multiple rounds of communica-
tion. Section 7 discusses different potential applications of the theoretical
results. Section 8 concludes. All omitted proofs are contained in the Ap-
pendix.
5 I extend analogously the remaining concepts, so that, for instance, N∗ij = N
∗
j ∩N∗i
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Figure 1: Timing of the Game
3 Truthful Revelation of Information
In this section, I identify the conditions under which there exists an equi-
librium in which all signals are credibly revealed. More precisely, I deter-
mine the conditions under which there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium where mij(xi) = xi for all i ∈ N ,j ∈ Ni(g) and xi ∈ < Notice that,
should all information be revealed, there exists a linear equilibrium in the
last stage6, where actions will satisfy.
ai = biixi +
∑
j∈Ni(g)
bijmj =
∑
j∈N∗i (g)
bijxj (3)
for some weights where bij ≥ 0 and ∑j bij ≤ 1. In general, the weight that i
puts on signal xj will depend on the total precision of the report of agent j
- that is, the accuracy of both its signal and its message -, the total amount
of information i has access to and the weight that others put on that signal.
Suppose ij ∈ g and consider the incentives of agent i to truthfully reveal his
type to j whenever everybody else does so. Using the envelope theorem, I
write his indirect utility in the last stage as
−E [Vi] = E
( ∑
j∈N∗i (g)
bijxj − θ)2
+
6 See Lemma 13 a proof of existence of linear equilibrium. Notice that if communica-
tion is truthful my model reduces to a standard beauty-contests with agents receiving a
number of signals equal to their degree and with endogenously determined precision. See
Myatt and Wallace (2011) for such a model.
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1n− 1
∑
k 6=i
E
( ∑
h∈N∗i (g)
bihxh −
∑
l∈Nj(g)\{i}
bjlxl − bjimi)2

Assuming that i reports truthfully to all other k ∈ Ni(g) and that all other
players report truthfully, their signals, i will have an incentive to report
truthfully to j if and only if.
bjixi = E
 ∑
h∈Ni(g)
bihxh −
∑
l∈Nj(g)\{i}
bjlxl | xi
 (4)
= biixi +
 ∑
h∈Ni(g)
bih −
∑
l∈N∗j (g)\{i}
bjl
E [xk | xi] (5)
Definition 1. A networked information structure {g, τ} is active-regular if
for every i, and for every j ∈ Ni(g), such that τi + τj > 0∑
l∈Ni(g)
τl =
∑
k∈Nj(g)
τk (6)
In words, a networked information structure is active-regular if for ev-
ery two agents in a given component, the total amount of information they
have access to is the same. The following Proposition characterizes the set
of networks that allow for truthful information transmission.
Proposition 2. Assume that τσ > 0. There exists an equilibrium with truthful
revelation at every link ij ∈ g such that τi+τj > 0 if and only if the networked
information structure is active-regular
The intuition for the result is simple. Truthful revelation requires that
hierarchies of beliefs are ex-ante aligned. This holds if the prior does not
convey any information or if information is symmetric (total precision of
the signals received by every agent is the same.) The reason is that an in-
formative prior creates a wedge between the expectation of the underlying
state conditional on a given signal and the signal. Hence, second order be-
liefs - the belief of i about the belief of j about θ -conditional on i’s signal
will differ with the current belief of i. This generates an incentive to i to
misrepresent her information and align those beliefs.
Notice that in my model cheap-talk equilibria does not rely on an exoge-
nous preference bias. Conditional on the realization of the state of the world,
all agents would agree on the best course of action. However, in the interim
stage, if the networked communication structure is not active-regular and
their neighbors would take their reports at face value, they would have an
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incentive to misreport their information. In such a case, well-connected
agents have an incentive to make conservative reports about the state of
the world (i.e. to claim that the deviation from the mean is smaller) while
badly connected ones have incentives to make aggressive reports. In equi-
librium, these biases are understood by the receiver and they result in a
reduction of the amount of information conveyed. Thus, differences in
ex-post information, introduces vagueness in communication and reduces
welfare.
Every equilibrium in the information transmission game is characterized
by a partition of the set of signals, where a given report m is to be under-
stood simply as x ∈ [mk,mk+1]. Unfortunately, since signals are normally
distributed on the real line, a full characterization of the communication
equilibria is not possible. This greatly difficulties the comparison between
truthful and non-truthful equilibria in terms of welfare. Because of this, I
devote most of my attention to networks for which a truthful equilibrium
exists.7
3.1 Active-Regular Networks
In order to characterize the set of networked-information structures for
which a truthful-revelation equilibrium exists, I will now dig deeper on
the nature of active-regular networks. In particular, I am concerned with
identifying conditions in the network g such that there exists a profile of in-
formation acquisition efforts τ for which (g, τ) is an active-regular network.
Moreover I shall impose that the resulting communication network (i.e. the
subnetwork of g constructed by deleting those links where no information
flows because none of the nodes acquire information) is connected.8
To this end, for a subset of agents, J , let pJ(i, j) be the length of the
shortest path between i and j, such that for all steps of the path (knkm ∈ g)
either kn ∈ J or km ∈ J or both. That is a a path in the network resulting
from eliminating all links not containing a player in J . Then,
Proposition 3. Fix g. Then,
1. If there exists a set of players J such that for all i ∈ N , |N∗i (g) ∪ J | = r
for some r > 0 and that pJ(i, j) <∞. Then, there exists τ such that g is
active-regular and connected.
7Truthful-revelation networks need are not (first-best) efficient and may be dominated
by non-truthful ones. See Section 6.
8See Example 7 below.
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Figure 2: An active-regular networked information structure
2. If g is a tree with diameter larger than 2, there exists no τ such that g is
active-regular and connected.
The first part of Proposition 2 offers a positive result. If r = 1, all net-
works have at least one such set J , which is called the maximal independent
set of g. However, not all networks have a maximal independent set which
renders the resulting network connected. For instance, a line with four
nodes g = {12, 23, 34} has only one maximal independent set. Namely,
J = {1, 4} but pJ(1, 4) =∞. On the other hand, for r > 1, then J is not an
independent set but the network remains active-regular. In particular, for
any regular network there exists a profile of information acquisition efforts
such that the network is active-regular.
Figure 2 depicts another active-regular networked information struc-
ture. Black nodes acquire some information (belong to J) while blue nodes
do not.
The second part of Proposition 2 suggests that truthful communication
at every link fails to obtain for a broad class of networks.9 The following
result, formally demonstrated in the Appendix, shows that a contagion-
effect may preclude full-revelation of information at almost every link.
Proposition 4. Let gT be a line with more than three individuals and assume
that τi > 0 for all i. For all i ∈ gT , there exists j ∈ Ni(gT ), such that i cannot
communicate truthfully with j
9Trees are the most common form of organization because it minimizes delay in in-
formation processing. See Section 7 for a discussion of the implications of this result for
organizational design.
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4 Information Acquisition
Even if the communication network ensures that a truthful revelation equi-
librium exists for a given τ , there is no guarantee that such profile of in-
formation acquisition would arise. Since in most real world organizations
individuals have to spend non-trivial resources to obtain information, the
communication network must also ensure that they have the appropriate
incentives to do so. The aim of this Section is to offer a partial characteri-
zation of the classes of networks that induce such equilibria.
To obtain the first positive result I follow the literature on public goods
in networks and assume that the technology is linear so that c(τ) = cτ .
As mentioned above, if communication is truthful, information acquisition
efforts become local public goods and so specialization arises in equilib-
rium. As shown by Bramoulle and Kranton (2007) in such a game the set
of agents who incur in some positive effort is a maximal independent set of
order r where no agent in the set is linked to another agent member but non
members are linked to at least r members. As it should be obvious there
is a close connection between the first part of Proposition 2 and maximal
independent sets of order r. The difference is that (i) all non-members must
have exactly r connections with the members of the set and (ii) those in
the set must also have r − 1 connections inside. This second difference is
erased for the case of r = 1. Indeed we have that
Proposition 5. Suppose that c(τ) = cτ . g admits an equilibrium with truth-
ful revelation if and only if it has a maximal independent set of order 1 such
that for all i ∈ N , |N∗i (g) ∪ J | = 1.
It is straightforward to check that this induces an equilibrium. Indeed,
since every agent has access to the same amount of information τ ∗, it must
be that V ′(τ ∗) = c. Since the resulting set satisfies Proposition 2, the net-
work induces an equilibrium with truthful revelation. Thus, information
acquisition efforts are public goods and the profile of efforts must be a max-
imal independent set. Notice finally that, if it exists, the set of equilibrium
configurations leading to a truthful revelation equilibrium is a selection of
those leading to an equilibrium in the public-goods game. For instance,
if the network g is a star (g = {12, 13, ..., 1n}), there are two maximal in-
dependent sets of arbitrary order r (J = 1 and J = N \ 1) but a unique
maximal independent set of order 1, J = 1. In this case, it is also the pro-
file that maximizes the utilitarian’s welfare function.10 Finally notice that
10See Section 5 for a discussion of welfare considerations in this model.
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Figure 3: A line with truthful revelation
Theorem 2 in Bramoulle and Kranton (2007) shows that for a stable equi-
librium to arise in the public goods game the set of specialists must be a
maximal independent set of order r > 2. The intuition is that, since efforts
are strategic substitutes, a downwards deviation by a member of J triggers
an upwards deviation by his neighbors unless the marginal utility of an ad-
ditional amount of effort is lower than its cost. In the game presented here,
however, an equilibrium with a maximal independent set of order 1 may
be stable since the degree of depreciation is endogenous. To give a simple
example, consider the following equilibrium strategies: Agents in J choose
precision τ ∗ while agents not in J acquire no additional information. If any
agent deviates, the babbling equilibrium is played. The equilibrium is sta-
ble since a downwards deviation in the amount of information acquired is
substituted by other players’ effort but the agent is excluded of the resulting
information.
For more general cost functions, however, the connection with the public-
goods literature becomes more tenuous. For instance, if c(τ) is strictly con-
vex and the network is regular with degree k, then there exists a symmetric
equilibrium where all agents choose V ′(τ) = c′( τ
k
) and the profile of infor-
mation transmission is truthful. More generally, specialization may occur
but two different specialists may provide effort in equilibrium.
Finally, is there any pattern in the information acquisition profile that
may result in equilibrium? Recent contributions Calvo´-Armengol et al.
(2011) suggest that information acquisition would typically be monotonic
in the position of different players in the network because their marginal
return from additional information will typically be larger. In this model,
however, the interplay of information transmission and acquisition breaks
down this pattern. In particular, consider the following example.
Example 6. Assume that g is a line with and let c(τ) = cτ . There exists
an equilibrium with truthful information transmission and non-monotone
pattern of information acquisition
The idea for this example is depicted in Figure 3. By Proposition32,
there does not exist an equilibrium with truthful revelation inducing a con-
nected subgraph. There exists, however, an equilibrium with truthful reve-
lation of information, inducing a collection of disconnected components.
12
In general, different communication structures would lead to different
patterns of information acquisition. As already pointed out, if information
transmission is truthful, information acquisition efforts become perfect sub-
stitutes and the resulting equilibrium has a close connection with the set of
equilibria of a standard publics-good game. On the other hand, if the com-
munication equilibrium were characterized by full babbling, information
acquisition efforts become strategic complements (see Hellwig and Veld-
kamp (2009)).
5 Welfare
For a network g, and an equilibrium of that network (a∗,m∗, τ ∗), let W be
the corresponding utilitarian social welfare function. Namely,
maxW = −∑
i∈N
1
N
∫
U(a∗(si,m(s−i)), τ ∗, θ)dΦ(θ) (7)
Let W ∗ < 0 be its value. The following proposition characterizes the set of
optimal networks for linear costs for equilibria with truthful revelation.
Proposition 7. Suppose c(τ) = cτ . W ∗ =
√
c and it is achieved by any
network g if there exists i ∈ N such that for all j 6= i, ij ∈ g.
The intuition is straightforward. Proposition 4 shows that a network in-
duces a truthful revelation equilibrium with linear costs only if every agent
observes at most one signal. All networks in that class yield the same incen-
tives for information acquisition but only a star avoids costly duplication of
efforts. It should be noticed, however, that the equilibrium information
acquisition effort is independent of n, and, therefore the outcome is ineffi-
cient.
5.1 Welfare and Noisy Information Transmission
Up to now I have devoted all my attention to networks inducing truthful
revelation of information. However, since information acquisition efforts
are perfect substitutes, individual incentives are not aligned with social
welfare and the outcome is typically inefficient. Example 8 below shows
that truthful revelation is neither necessary nor sufficient for a network to
induce a second-best equilibrium outcome. More precisely, it shows that
that welfare may be higher in a network that does not induce truthful rev-
elation as compared with the star network.
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r V1 V2 V3 V4 W
1 0, 5 0, 5 0 0 0, 5
3 0, 5 0, 51063 0, 5002 0, 334 0, 5835
5 0, 5 0, 33016 0, 5 0, 3998 0, 4756
6 0, 5 0, 32982 0, 49992 0, 39975 0, 47545
Figure 4: Welfare and Information Transmission
In order to show this I first have to characterize the equilibrium when
individuals do not reveal truthfully all their information. As discussed in
Section 3 this is a challenging task since the distribution of signals is Gaus-
sian and the support infinite. I circumvent this problem by focusing on a
simple class of equilibria: Individuals report only whether their signals ex-
ceed their prior mean or not. It is easy to show that, irrespectively of the
network, such communication profile is incentive compatible.
Example 8. Consider a set of 40 players linked through the network g
where a number r of hubs are linked two 40 − r − 1 other (peripheral)
agents and there are no links between hubs. Further assume that the infor-
mation acquisition choice is binary so that c is the cost of acquiring a signal
with precision 1. Clearly, for r > 0, there is no truthful revelation of in-
formation. I consider the following equilibrium outcome: All hubs acquire
information and report whether their signal is positive or negative.11
Below I display the results of the simulation for different number of
hubs. The first column captures the residual variance of the hubs. The
second column captures the residual variance of the peripheral agents. The
third column measures the expected loss in coordination between hubs and
non-hubs, while the fourth measures the coordination loss between hubs.
The last column is the Welfare Loss.12
Notice that adding more hubs has the immediate effect of decreasing
welfare since (i) information transmission becomes noisy and (ii) hubs and
peripheral agents fail to coordinate on the same action. As the number of
hubs increase, though, the increase in information acquisition efforts over-
comes the resulting noise in communication and total welfare increases.13
11This is an equilibrium for c low enough
12If communication is not truthful, optimal policy functions are approximated by a linear
function of the posteriors. Reported estimates from 100000 simulations.
13For a fixed n, the optimal number of hubs is bounded because hubs fail to coordinate.
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6 Repeated Communication
One of the main driving forces of the results presented above is the use
of interim beliefs and one round of communication. That is, since agents
only communicate once, they rely heavily on the beliefs they hold after
observing their signal, when making their reports. This is the source of
their intrinsic bias. I shall explore now this assumption by constructing a
dynamic environment in which the game presented above is (potentially)
infinitely repeated. I construct the game following the ideas in Bimpikis
et al. (2014)).
The game is as follows. At time zero, every agent makes some invest-
ment in information. Then, both θ and the signals are drawn from the
appropriate distributions. At time t = 1, agents report through the net-
work g1 = gT some messages conditional on their signals and their posi-
tions in the network m1ij(xi) ∈ R ∪ {∅} 14. Let mi1 be the profile of reports
received by agent i in period 1. Then, agents take actions ai,1 ∈ R ∪ ∅
where ai = ∅ is defined as inaction. After that, actions are realized and
agents who took an action leave the game15. Agents who decided to stay
inactive keep move into the next period by losing δ > 0. At time t = 2,
g2 = g1 ∩ {i ∈ N : ai,1 = ∅} and again chose a report mij(xi;mi1) ∈ R∪ {∅}
where ij ∈ g2 and an action ai,2 ∈ R∪∅. Whenever at the end of time t, the
set {i ∈ N : ai,t = ∅} = ∅ the game ends and every agent receives his payoff
according to the original payoff net of the corresponding loss for delay δti,
where ai,ti 6= ∅.
It is straightforward to realize than any equilibrium of the stage-game
analyzed in Section 3 will remain an equilibrium here. Indeed, if every
other player is expected to leave the network after making one round of
communication only, it is in the best interest of the remaining agent to do
so, independently of the amount of information she has received and for
every δ > 0. Thus,
Proposition 9. Suppose that {τ, g1} is active-regular. Then there is an equilib-
rium of the repeated game in which every agent reports truthfully and makes
an action in the first period.
This implies that the positive results in the previous section survive into
this extended game. However, do the negative ones survive? A qualified
14I allow for explicit witholding of information.
15This is the main restriction of the framework since it will not be optimal for them
to leave (for sufficiently small δ) and clearly their information is still valuable for others.
Nevertheless, the incentives to provide information will be unambiguously biased after the
action has been made.
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answer would be yes. In particular, there are some networked information
structures at which information cannot be transmitted at any round.
Proposition 10. Suppose that {g1, τ} is a line, and assume that τi > 0 for
all i. Then, if there exists an equilibrium where all agents exit at (or before)
t¯, then for every t = 1, 2, ..t¯, there exists an equilibrium in which all agents
leave at period t. Further, no equilibrium involves perfect communication.
The intuition is simple. Suppose that a given agent (i) has only one
neighbor (j). Suppose further that his neighbor has at least one additional
informed neighbor. j takes the action (and leaves) whenever he has ac-
quired enough information, and therefore does not transmit the last piece
of information to i. The interim beliefs remain misaligned and there is no
truthful revelation of information. Thus, in this extension of the game, as
long as players leave the network after taking their actions with positive
probability the qualitative features of the static equilibrium remains, even
if they hinge on agents using interim beliefs.
In other words, whenever communication takes place between agents
who ”expect to learn more on the future”, the results presented above are
likely to hold. However, in most studies, the assumption is that players are
either informed ex-ante or ex-post but they never get ”some information”
in the interim. Repeated communication games, for instance, assume that
players have acquired all the relevant information at stage zero. I argue
that this assumption has deep implications in the results, and it is not clear
why this possibility should be ruled out.
An exception in this literature is Bimpikis et al. (2014) They study
strategic communication using interim beliefs. The main difference is that
in their model there are no payoff externalities and the only motive for
withholding information is to retain other agents in the networks. To man-
age so, she is willing to misreport her true signal in order to ”confuse” her
peer and make him stay. This is not possible in my model since the residual
variance does not depend on the ”content” of the reports.
Proposition 11. Suppose {g1, τ} is not active-regular, and assume that τi > 0
for all i. If there exists i ∈ N such that Ni(g) ⊂ Nj(g), Ni(g) 6= Nj(g), then
either both agents hold the same information (and take the same action) or
there is no equilibrium with perfect information transmission between them.
This result shows that poorly informed individuals (in that they have
access to a subset of the sources of their neighbors) will also have problems
to communicate with those sources, independently of how many rounds
of communications are allowed. This may seem counterintuitive, since an
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agent who talks to a poorly informed agent has a very good posterior belief
over the belief of his neighbor. The problem is that this second order belief
may be far away from the belief he holds! This yields a novel intuition
that was not present in the static game. Namely, since agents are willing
to wait only if waiting yields new and useful information, communicating
with agents who have access to that information is not only more useful,
but easier (in the sense that it reduces the vagueness in communication)
than to those who have no new information.
Equilibrium behavior depends (discontinuously) in the discounting of
players, as it is the case in many dynamic games. If the cost of continuing
in the game is very high, the equilibrium unravels and players leave. If
players leave earlier, perfect communication breaks down and thus both
coordination and information sharing decreases sharply. Absent any cost,
the network structure is not relevant since information would travel in a
frictionless manner and eventually coordination would be achieved. In this
sense, it is the cost of time that gives a specific content to the network itself.
Proposition 12. Fix a cost δ, a networked information structure {g, τ} and
a truthful equilibrium profile (m∗, a∗). There exists a networked information
structure {g′, τ} such that (m∗, a∗) is an equilibrium in the static game.
This result clarifies the main assumption of the model. Namely, that
there is some cost of communicating that precludes information to be trans-
mitted fast enough throughout the network that the result is equivalent to
one in which information is publicly shared instantaneously. Since the re-
duction of costs in information processing and transmission are one of the
main objectives of organizations (Arrow (1974)), this assumption seems
the most natural one.
7 Applications
The model presented in this paper has two main features: a beauty-contest-
type payoff function and a bilateral communication network. Beauty-contest
games have been widely applied to the study of financial markets (Allen
et al. (2006)) and complex organizations (Dessein and Santos (2006)).
They provide a simple way to introduce strategic complementarities, dis-
perse information and decentralized decision-making. On the other hand,
bilateral communication networks have received increasing attention in the
economics literature, providing a successful framework for the study of fi-
nancial markets (Ozsoylev and Walden (2011)).
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More generally, the model may be applied to many different settings in
which communication is strategic and unverifiable. For instance, it may be
useful to understand information sharing between firms operating in simi-
lar markets where strategic complementarities are present (Raith (1996).)
Pairwise communication is potentially less costly and more difficult to de-
tect but may create problems in terms of credibility. Similarly, this frame-
work may be applied to the study of complex organizations, where informa-
tion is disperse and and coordination is key for performance. In these orga-
nizations, decisions must be taken rapidly and communication is informal.
For instance, coordination, information acquisition and good communica-
tion are the key factors underlying the design of Intelligence Agencies (Gar-
icano and Posner (2005)). The results of this model suggest that complex
organizations (with multiple layers and partial specialization) may not pro-
vide adequate incentives for information transmission while smaller, closely
connected teams may outperform them both in terms of coordination and
use of the available information.
Hierarchies and Information Sharing
Most of the previous literature on communication in organizations agreed
that hierarchies are an efficient way to transmit and process information.
Radner (1993) shows that a hierarchical structure (a tree in the jargon of
graph theory) is the most efficient structure for an organization that tries
to process and summarize a large amount of disseminated information.
Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) extended this logic to environments with
an infinite stream of signals that have to be processed with minimal delay.
Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1988) showed that, under bounded rationality
of managers, hierarchical organizations are the most efficient way to use a
group to overcome the limitations of its members. Garicano (2000) shows
that a hierarchy is the natural organization for a firm that must solve prob-
lems in order to produce if workers cannot identify those problems they
cannot solve.
A common feature of all these models, however, is that individual mem-
bers of these organizations are not strategic. In particular, they acquire
the information they are told to acquire, they transmit it truthfully and
they take the action that the organizations wants them to take, conditional
on the information available. In my model, however, agents are rational,
strategic players who try to maximize their payoffs in a coordination game
under uncertainty. Uncertainty creates a wedge in the way agents with dif-
ferent locations update their beliefs and, therefore, incentives to misreport
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their information. In hierarchies (or trees) agents at the top are bound to
receive more information than agents at the bottom, and thus, information
transmission fails to be efficient.
In the real world this problem is solved in the following way. Infor-
mation is acquired by lower-ranked agents who communicate it upwards
to managers. These managers aggregate information and pass it back to
the periphery in the form of ”recommendations” or ”commands”. There-
fore, although hierarchies are efficient in terms of information handling
they require some source of ”power relation” among agents in order to
conveniently achieve the organizational goal. In the model presented here,
however, decision-making is decentralized and thus, hierarchical informa-
tion processing fails to induce truthful communication.
8 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that modeling explicitly the information acqui-
sition and transmission may be important to understand the functioning of
many organizations and markets. I have shown how the topology of the
communication network and information acquisition technology affect the
quality of information transmission within the organization. I have fully
characterized the set of networked information structures that support per-
fect communication as an equilibrium and the pattern of information ac-
quisition they generate.
These results highlight the role of information asymmetries in commu-
nication and the way in which different network topologies generate those
asymmetries endogenously. I have also shown that, whenever information
revelation is not truthful, the pattern of information acquisition effort may
change dramatically. For instance, in the line with sufficiently many players
who hold some information, no agent can communicate truthfully with all
of her neighbors. Moreover, if the information acquisition is endogenous
an equilibrium may exist with truthful communication but the informa-
tion acquired in equilibrium will fail to be monotonic in the centrality of
the players. This results are in sharp contrast with the previous literature,
which highlighted the role of centrality in the intensity of the effort.
Future research may provide a better understanding of those networks
where truthful revelation fails and study the incentives of individual agents
to establish communication channels with others. In this regard, exam-
ple 8 suggests that imperfect communication may be preferable if it en-
courages information acquisition, and overcomes the public-good external-
ity. The question remains, however, whether such networked information
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structures would naturally emerge if the network itself is endogenous.
A Appendix
In this Appendix I show first that there exists a Linear Equilibrium under
Perfect Information Transmission as long as the Economy is large enough
compared with the maximum degree of a given player. The rest of the
Appendix contains omitted proofs
Lemma 13. Assume that the network is active-regular. Then, a Linear Equi-
librium exists. The weight that a given player puts on his neighbor’s signal is
decreasing in the amount of information he has access to and increasing in the
information this player provides and in the centrality measure of his neighbor.
Proof. The argument is standard. Assume everyone else follows a linear
strategy, and let agent i have a neighborhood Ni(g). He solves
minEi (θ − ai)2 + 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Ei(ai − aj)
s.t.Ei(aj) =
∑
k∈N∗ij
bjkxk +
∑
k∈Ni−j
bjkEi(xk)
First Order Condition is
ai =
1
2
Ei(θ) +
1
2(n− 1)

∑
j∈Ni(g)
[∑
k∈Nij bjkxk + Ei(θ)
∑
k∈Ni−j bjk
]
+∑
j /∈N∗i (g)
[∑
k∈Nij bjkxk + Ei(θ)
∑
k∈Nj−i(g) bjk
] 
(8)
We can rewrite this expression as
ai =
1
2
1 + 1n− 1
∑
j 6=i
∑
k∈N∗j−i
bjk
Ei(θ) + 12(n− 1)
∑
j 6=i
∑
k∈N∗ij
bjkxk (9)
Since
Ei(θ) =
∑
k∈N∗i (g)
τkxk∑
k∈Ni(g) τk + τσ
(10)
we can write
ai =
∑
k∈N∗i (g)
bikxk (11)
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where the vector b may be identified through matrix algebra. For instance,
if the network is regular we have bik = b for all i, k, i ∈ N∗i (k). Thus, letting
m be the degree of the network we have
ai = mb
∑
k∈Ni(g)
xk
b =
[
1− K −M
2(n− 1)
]−1
1
2
τ
mτ + τσ
[
1 +
M
n− 1
]
where M is the number of links in the network and K is the number of
links not in the network. More generally, we can write
bij =
µij∑
j∈Ni∗ (g) µij + µ0
(12)
for some non-negative weight vector µ
Proof of Proposition 2. If τσ = 0, E [xk | xi] = xi and ∑j∈Ni(g) bij = 1 for all
i ∈ N . Hence condition (4) holds. Otherwise it is needed that both bji = bii
and ∑
h∈Ni(g)
bih =
∑
h∈Nj∗ (g)\i
bih (13)
Clearly, if the networked information structure is active-regular the con-
dition holds because bji = bii and
∑
l∈Nj(g) bjl =
∑
k ∈ Ni(g)bik. Now, as-
sume that the network is not regular so that there exists a pair ij ∈ g,
|Ni(g)| > |Nj(g)|, To see that it never holds if the condition holds does not
hold notice that bji the only source of discrepancy between players is the
amount of information received. In particular, i and j agree about the de-
gree of agent j so that there is no bias generated in asymmetric networks
per se. However, if i holds more information than j
τi∑
k∈Nj(g) τk
>
τi∑
k∈Ni(g) τk
(14)
and so bii 6= bji. But then ∑
h∈Ni(g)
bih −
∑
l∈N∗j (g)\{i}
bjl 6= 0 (15)
so that truthful revelation will not be part of any equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. For the first part, let τi = 0 for all i ∈ N \ J and
τi = τ
∗ for i ∈ J . Clearly, for all i ∈ N , ∑j∈Ni(g) τi = r ∗ τ ∗. Further
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because pJ(i, j) <∞, gτ is connected. For the second part, notice that trees
are minimally connected networks, so that all links are essential. Because
the network is minimally connected there must exist at least one player i
who is only linked to some other player j. Clearly, it must be that τj > 0
for otherwise the network would be disconnected. If they have the same
amount of information it must be that no other player k in Nj(g) \ Ni(g)
acquires information. But because the network is minimally connected and
it is not a star, k must have at least some other neighbor k′ 6= j, such
that τ ′k > 0. Thus,
∑
l∈N∗j (g) τl <
∑
l∈N∗
k
(g) τl and the networked information
structure is not active-regular.
Proof of Proposition 4. A line is such that there exists exactly one path link-
ing any two agents and such there exist two agents 1 and n who have only
one link. If an agent i communicates truthfully with both of her neighbors,
it must be that their residual variances are the same. Since they are com-
municating truthfully, the residual variance of i equals the inverse of the
sum of their precisions. The residual variance of, say, i − 1 is affected by
her communication with i− 2. If i− 2 fails to communicate truthfully with
i− 1, it cannot be that i communicates truthfully with i− 1 since her resid-
ual variance would be larger 16. Notice finally that for i−2 to communicate
truthfully with i−1, it must again be that their residual variances are equal.
Repeating the argument in succession we arrive to agent 1 who does not
have additional links. Thus, 1 and 2 will not communicate truthfully and
the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 5. The if part is trivial. For the only if part notice that,
in a truthfully revealing equilibrium, information acquisition effort is a pub-
lic good. Because the technology is linear, Theorem 1 in Bramoulle and
Kranton (2007) implies that no two individuals who acquire information
may be linked to each other. By Proposition 2, no individual can be linked
to more than one informed agent if one of its neighbors is linked to only
one. Thus, the result obtains.
Proof of Proposition 7. By Proposition 4, if the network induces a truthful-
revelation equilibrium, every agent must have access to at most one signal.
Among all networks of this class, the star avoids wasteful duplication and
improves coordination. Thus, it cannot be dominated. To see the bound
on the payoff notice that, for the individual who acquires information, the
16all that matters is that the updating of the posterior that i − 1 makes will always be
different from i′s posterior because the information revealed would be a partition of the
real line
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marginal variance reduction, V ′(τ) equals the cost of acquiring information
c. In particular
V ′(τ ∗) =
1
τ 2
= c (16)
Thus, τ ∗ = 1√
c
. Since all agents would agree on the same action, we get
W = −V (τ ∗)− 1
N
cτ ∗ =
√
c (17)
Proof of Proposition 10. There are two cases. First assume that no informa-
tion is withheld. Then, assume for a contradiction that information revela-
tion is perfect. Then, it must be the case that every two individuals obtain
the same amount of information at time t∗i where t
∗
i is such that i takes her
action at t∗i . Notice that in a pure strategy equilibrium t
∗
i is deterministic (in
particular, it does not depend on the realizations of the signals). Clearly, 1
should leave in the same period as 2, since in the following period 1 will
not receive new information17. However, at the period in which 2 leaves,
if optimal, he shall get at least one more signal. Hence, 1 is always less
informed than 2 and results in Proposition 3 apply.
It is also straightforward to see that every agent leaving at period t =
1, 2..., t¯ it is an equilibrium, provided sufficiently many signals are obtained
in each round. In particular t¯ would be the earliest period at which the
value of two additional signals (on top of 2(t¯ − 1) + 1) to the most central
agent is lower than δ if that period is lower than n+1
2
and t¯ = n+1
2
other-
wise. In this later case, all information would eventually spread through
the network.
To conclude, I show that withholding of information does not change
the results . First notice that withholding information to j for less than t∗j
periods is never optimal (i would just reduce his own influence on other
players obtaining the same amount of information.) Now, suppose that
agent i conceals his information until period t∗j - that is, the period at which
j leaves, and assume that i and j have access to the same information, then
I show that i − 1 must have access to less information than them. If i and
j have access to the same information and t = t∗j they both leave. Then, if
i − 1 is to have the same amount of information as them, it must be that
he receives a report of the same precision at period t∗j (or later), and then
leave. However, in the line, this requires that there exists another agent
17If the equilibrium involves mixed strategies, the strategy of player 1, conditional on
observing that player 2 left is to leave in the following period, but no more information is
revealed to him.
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i − t∗j who originated that report and now gets to i − 1. Now, if that is the
case, then at period t∗j , j must have received another report coming from
agent i− 1− t∗j , and thus, j has access to more information than i.
Proof of Proposition 11 . The idea is similar as in Proposition 10. Suppose
the result does not hold. Then, there exists j ∈ Ni(g) such that i can
communicate truthfully with j. We know that it must be the case that their
residual variances are equal, and thus they have received the same number
of signals. Since i’s neighborhood is a subset of that of j, this can happen
if and only if in the last round of communication whatever j learns also
i does. Hence, it must be that j i) does not receive information that was
not held by another agent in the neighborhood of i in the previous period
and ii) decides not to leave until he gets to that stage. If δ is sufficiently
large, he will leave before. If δ is sufficiently small, however, he will stay
until all information is received. Since this must happen for all j ∈ Ni(g)
in order for i to communicate truthfully, it must be the case, that at time
t∗i = t
∗
j for all j ∈ Ni(g), no new information arrives to the neighborhood of
i so that all information must be aggregated before everyone leaves, thus
establishing the claim.
Proof of Proposition 12. First notice that we do not have to vary the pattern
of information acquisition, only the links between agents. Take a network
g and a (truthful) equilibrium for that network, the result is established by
constructing g′ such that incentives are unaltered in the equivalent static
game. First of all, it is obvious that if a given agent i eventually obtains
information generated at node k, then ik ∈ g′. The converse is also true,
so that if i does not obtain information generated at node k′, ik′ /∈ g′. This
defines the only candidate for g′. Notice that the equilibrium is truthful,
and so apply Proposition 7. The result follows directly.
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